Situation Report by PALM Strategic

The Russian Ministry of Justice announced at the beginning of July that it had asked the Jewish Agency in Moscow to close its office, and justified this action by accusing the Agency of collecting information about Russian citizens illegally and leaking them outside Russia. It also encouraged the immigration of citizens from Russia, especially the elites and those who are distinguished in economy, sciences, and commercial works. Moreover, the Israeli occupation recently announced Russia's assassination of Leonid Gozman, a Jewish-Russian figure and one of the most prominent opponents of Butin under the pretext of not reporting his receipt of the Russian nationality during the allowed period. 

These developments come as a last episode in the series of the deteriorating relations between the Israeli occupation and Russia, which have clearly appeared in light of the Russia-Ukraine war. The Israeli occupation tried to commit neutrality as must as possible to avoid aligning with one of the poles of conflict -Russia and United States- and avoid the loss of the political and military benefits gained by the two parties. However, its pursuit failed and it found itself obliged to condemn the Russian attack and support Ukraine with light military tools like military headgear and medical equipment, enraging the Russian side.

Russia claims that its procedures come within the legal path, while the Israeli occupation confirms that they come in light of the political conflict. To illustrate, the occupation links between these procedures and Russia's delay to receive a legal delegation to discuss the crisis, as well as highlights Russia's pursuit to enhance the coalition with Iran and Turkey in a way that might conflict with the Israeli interests, especially in Syria.

Analysis and Insight of the Scene:

• The Ukraine-Russia war has affected the nature of relations between the occupation and Russia, and Israel's negative stance on the Russian invasion -which has always tried to avoid- angered Russia, which has shown itself to be blind to the occupation following that stance, especially against the Then Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, who later became head of government.

• The Israeli occupation realizes the importance of maintaining the security and political gains achieved with Russia, especially with regard to its operations in Syria and the combating of the Iranian presence there. It also seeks to continue this coordination without any conflict with Russia.
• The Israeli occupation fears Russia's expanding procedures against its institutions, and closure of more Jewish organizations, which are active in Russia and belong to the occupation government. 
• The Israeli occupation tries to absorb the Russian anger and avoid provoking it, particularly in light of the expected consequences of such a behavior, notably Russia's allowance of Iran's expansion in Syria, the boycott of coordination to prevent the Israeli occupation from practicing its operations in Syria, and the strengthening of the resistance in a way that benefits the Palestinian cause. 

Possible Scenarios: Based on the abovementioned analysis and reading of the scene, following is the expected:

1. The Israeli occupation through its diplomatic arms might initiate to contain the Russian stance and reduce the losses resulted from its positions on the Russia-Ukraine war, especially in light of the occupation's absolute commitment to the United States. What supports this scenario is the possibility of that the expanding conflict might lead to harming the strategic Israeli interests at the level of the Syrian file and the Palestinian cause altogether. 
2. The gap between the Israeli occupation and Russia might expand, and the conflicts might increase in a way that causes a full disharmony between the two parties. Also, there is a possibility that this disharmony harms the Israeli interests and benefits the Palestinian cause and the Syrian file. This scenario is more present in light of social and political connectors between the Israeli occupation and Russia that might heal the rifts and narrow the gap, as well as the occupation's concern about satisfying Russia. 

In general, all scenarios are present and possible, with preference for the first scenario, whose success is relatively expected in accordance with the development of events and the amount of initiatives marketed by the occupation to satisfy Russia and maintain the relations.