DR NOR AISHAH HANIFA
Senior Lecturer
Department of IR, Law, and Security
Faculty of Defence Studies and Management
National Defence University of Malaysia
Jerusalem (the term used without prejudice), the city of peace, has never seen peace in history. The city was conquered by Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Hasmoneans, Herodians, Romans, Byzantines, Umayyads, Crusaders, Ayyubids, Mamelukes, Ottomans, Britishers, and Jordanians, before Israel occupied it in 1967. Why is Jerusalem attracted to various powers in the past and still contested in the present? Why is Jerusalem the last issue to be addressed in the peace process?
History has a few explanations to explain why Jerusalem is vulnerable to power politics and occupations. One of the factors is its historical value as a centre of civilization in the Middle East. Another factor is its connection with Abrahamic religions. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam have historical references to Jerusalem. Historians often cited other factors like trade, commerce, and education. In the modern day, Palestinians and Jews claim a spiritual connection in the contest to own Jerusalem. Jerusalem has become “spiritual Jerusalem” for both Palestinians and Jews. Both gain spiritual strength from Jerusalem in the never-ending conflict. Spiritual strength in the conflict is exceeding the boundary of humanity or social studies.
Strategy offers a clear explanation of why Jerusalem is being fought over the Israel-Palestine conflict. The concept “Centre of Gravity” (COG) appears in Clausewitz’s (On War), plays a very significant role in the conflict, and attracts war scholars. Clausewitz’ COG, explained by scholars, carries various interpretations. In Book 6, Chapter 27, Clausewitz says, “A centre of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely. It provides the most effective target for a blow, as well as the heaviest blow struck by the centre of gravity.”
He also says COG is “the hub of all power and movement.” Based on Clausewitz's thoughts, Jerusalem has been a prominent city since ancient times, densely populated and functioning as a centre of civilization, politics, religion, trade, and education. When touching on the hub of all power, Clausewitz directly and indirectly asserts moral and physical strength. Jerusalem as a spiritual city energizes Jews and Palestinians alike. The formation of the State of Israel and the State of Palestine focused on Jerusalem as the capital city. In the Basic Law of 1980, Israel says Jerusalem is the “eternal city.” Palestinians claim Jerusalem as Al-Quds (the Holy). The spiritual and moral attachment toward Jerusalem is so deep that the Jerusalem issue can be an exploding and escalating issue. The Palestinians' intifada is good testimony, but not strong enough to affect the COG.
The Six Day War of 1967 is a good example to discuss on COG. The Six Day War has several characters from war history. The war can be studied through various lenses, including the Cold War, the Arab-Israel conflict, Pan-Arabism, Palestinian nationalism, Zionism, and Judaism. The war started as a conventional warfare between the Arab forces and Israel. Using a pre-emptive strategy, Israel demonstrated superior military strength against the adversary. Obviously, Israel has lacked a military edge against the Arab forces in the war. Israel deployed 264,000 troops versus the 547,000 troops of the Arab forces. The number of tanks and aircraft is also vastly different: Israel has 800 tanks versus 2,504 Arab forces tanks, and Israel has 250-300 aircraft versus 957 Arab forces aircraft. How was Israel able to annex Jerusalem and other territories?
There was a lack of spiritual or moral strength in this war. The IDF forces occupied the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, West Bank, and East Jerusalem. In Book 6, Chapter 27, Clausewitz connects moral/spiritual strength with another concept, “cohesion.” But he articulates, as in the world of inanimate matter, the effect produced on a COG is determined and limited by the cohesion of the parts.” Cohesion means solidarity or unity of all military and non-military parts toward a goal. Clausewitz says, “Where there is cohesion, the analogy of the COG can be applied.” Unbreakable cohesion in the 1967 war, derived from the spiritual/moral strength of the IDF forces and Jews, could be a true lesson to Palestine.
When the IDF forces entered the Old City of Jerusalem, the day was celebrated with prayers at the Western Wall. Jews were forbidden to enter Jerusalem during the Jordanian occupation of Jerusalem (1948–1967). When Jerusalem was annexed, Israel vowed to maintain Jerusalem in its hands. Jerusalem and the Six Day War have always served as a model for understanding strategy. Palestinians should take courage to learn the knowledge of war from their adversary to plan a strategy for the future. Six major lessons can be drawn from the adversary by Palestine. These points are mainly extracted from Clausewitz's (On War) and Sun Tzu’s (The Art of War) discussions.
1. Identify the enemy’s main effort: understand the Course of Action (COA); enemy objectives, main and supporting efforts, decisive points, and key decision points. By identifying the COA, the state actor (party) can identify the adversary’s COG. Israel understands the mechanism well in the Six Day War to break the enemy's will.
2. Identify the disparity: between the adversary’s current strength and desired strength. Israel was able to defeat the Arab forces because it could understand and assess the adversary to win the war. Continuous assessment of the adversary’s strength is a key point in winning a war.
3. Identify the strategy: to defeat the adversary, the party needs to identify what can be done to defeat or degrade the adversary’s critical requirements. Israel develops the ability to check continuously with conventional and hybrid methods, and act based on the adversary’s weaknesses.
4. Identify the friction: to win over the adversary, a party needs to know and understand the friction in war (obstacles, weaknesses, vulnerability). By overcoming friction, a party has a probability of defeating the adversary. Israel faces friction in war, but their continuous assessment enables them to overcome friction in war. The Israel-Hamas war is a good example to show Israel’s and Hamas’ friction on the battlefield. Hamas has more friction than Israel, which explains why Hamas wages a limited war, not an unlimited war, to defeat Israel.
5. Understand the power: having great national power is critical to winning the war. The party should understand their national power and the adversary’s power. The decision to wage war should be made once the party is confident that the probability of winning the war is higher. Confidence is determined by national power, where military power is a component. When there is an asymmetric power, the party needs to avoid an open war with its adversary unless the party is confident its moral strength is extremely strong enough to win the war. All asymmetric wars cannot be like the victorious Vietnam War.
6. Make rational calculation: important in times of war and peace. The party should do rational calculation before formulating a strategy. Rational calculation of war should answer some of these questions: what is the goal, why is the war unavoidable, where to attack? (The first blow) When to attack? What is the terrain (geography), how to conduct the war, what operations, what tactics, what weapons, how much the war cost, how much is left in the country’s treasure, how long to conduct the war, how to sustain the war (prolonged war), who is in charge of the war (planning and execution), what is the condition of soldiers (mentally and physically), what is the probability of winning the war, what can be expected from allies, what are the risks and implications, how to protect civilians and safe lives, and what to do in the post-war period (after win or lose). At the same time, the party should analyse the rational calculations the adversary makes before indulging in war. Israel won the Six Day War in 1967 because their strategy answered some crucial questions.
Learning and understanding strategy from the adversary would help Palestine develop a competent strategy to win in the conflict. Again, Palestine needs to decide, according to time and power politics, which instrument of politics and policy is suitable. The six points are useful in military engagement and diplomacy. In other words, for war and peace. By studying some of these critical questions, the Palestinians come to a crossroads to choose which strategy to apply toward their objective.