As Israeli military vehicles advance through the eastern and southern areas of the Gaza Strip, the territory’s 2.2 million residents have become trapped in three isolated enclaves that together account for only about 30% to 35% of Gaza’s total land area. This arrangement is not merely a geographic or administrative change—it reflects a broader plan aimed at imposing economic and political control over Gaza, shrinking the available space, and severely restricting movement and daily life for residents as a precursor to creating harsh, coercive conditions that lead to what is essentially “voluntary” or forced displacement.

The plan aims to establish a new military and security reality in which the three isolated areas are controlled by land and sea, turning them into cantons—essentially large open-air prisons. The areas are:
    1.    The first enclave: Gaza City and its western neighborhoods, located west of Salah al-Din Street.
    2.    The second enclave: The central region, including the Nuseirat, Zawaida, and Deir al-Balah camps—areas west of Salah al-Din Street in the central Gaza Strip.
    3.    The third enclave: The Al-Mawasi area of Khan Younis, located along the coast, extending to the western neighborhoods of Khan Younis.

This means that, in principle, Israel would have military control over most of the Gaza Strip, with full control over movement between the three enclaves as well as access to the Rafah border crossing with Egypt. Furthermore, it would control the flow of humanitarian aid through organizations with humanitarian facades but operated covertly by Israeli interests.

The plan also includes reducing Gaza’s population by half—bringing it down to around one million people. This would make it easier to manage and tightly control the remaining population, ensuring a security grip that eliminates any possibility of resistance in the foreseeable future. Unlike previous displacement campaigns, this time the aim is not to forcibly expel the population en masse, but rather to engineer long-term displacement over a decade through “facilitation” and strategic pressure.

This, at least for now, is what Netanyahu and his allies are planning during this exceptionally difficult stage for the Palestinian people in Gaza. However, plans are one thing and the reality on the ground is another. This plan is not a foregone conclusion, nor is its outcome inevitable. Here’s why:

First: All of these schemes, including this one, are closely tied to Netanyahu personally, his party, and his coalition partners from the religious Zionist and Jewish supremacy factions. If the Israeli government collapses—whether by the end of this year or the next—these plans are likely to collapse with it.

Second: The war cannot realistically continue for many more months, as Netanyahu desires. International pressure, especially from several influential European nations, is mounting rapidly.

Even though this plan has progressed, it does not mean Gaza’s future will unfold according to Netanyahu’s vision or by military force alone. These schemes are contingent upon the survival of the current coalition for several more years and on the continuation of the war at its current intensity for at least another year.