Dr. Ibrahim Mahmoud Habib

Many of the Palestinian people in Gaza fear of the possibility that the Israeli occupation would launch a new aggressive offensive over Gaza next Spring, particularly in Ramadan or during the Jewish holidays which might start by the middle of May up to its end. The scenes of massacres, killings and destructions are still etched in the Palestinians' minds and bring up their concerns by the approach of the holy month of Ramadan, which witnessed the Al-Quds Sword Battle (2021) and the bloody Israeli aggression on Gaza (2014). 

Such concerns support a group of remarkable field and political indications, such as the heavy presence of surveillance aircrafts in the sky of Gaza, and the state of incitement practiced by the Israeli occupation against Gaza and its resistance along with accusing it of standing behind the acts of resistance carried out in the occupied West Bank. In addition to that, the Security Naqab Summit that was held on February 26, 2023 in the presence of the United States, Jordan, Egypt and Palestine in an attempt to eliminate the Palestinian Resistance in the West Bank, and the quick visit of Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Some analysists realize Netanyahu's reasons behind his attitude to launch a new Israeli aggression on Gaza. He aims to achieve multiple goals; tto exhaust the resistance, to stop any acts of incitement practiced against the Israeli occupation in the occupied West Bank and to get out of the internal crisis that continues to aggravate after the escalation of anti-government demonstrations and the expanding civil disobedience. 

Such concerns and analyses are perhaps legitimate to a certain extent, yet not decisive in the right reading of the prospects of a new Israeli offensive on Gaza. The right situation report must depend on information and realistic reading of the factors contributing in the decision to start an offensive on Gaza. 

Through a deep reading, we observe that there are three main parties that influence the decision of the offensive: the Zionist entity with its political and military levels, the United States of America and the Palestinian Resistance. At the level of the Zionist entity, the political level is apparently busy with its inner problems and escalating protests. This level is unlikely to tend to launch a new offensive on Gaza in light of the large potential for the failure of this aggression which would hasten Netanyahu government's collapse. Regarding the military level, the military institution sees there is no need to start a new aggression amid its concern to maintain the state of deterrence and blockade imposed. Iran, furthermore, is expected to receive an air strike amid the frequent intelligence information about it getting close to produce the first nuclear bomb after increasing enrichment to more than 84%. 

In regard to the American influence on the Israeli occupation's military resolutions, it is quite explicit as the leaders of the Israeli occupation could not take any decision to start a war but by an American approval in order to ask for a military and political support and protection. It is unlikely that the United States would give the green light to launch a new offensive on Gaza for some regional and global reasons, in light of the not-so-good relations between the US administration and Netanyahu government. Its approval, as well, might harm its humanitarian image in this time under the double-standard policy practiced in the Arab-Zionist conflict and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. 

Hamas is probably unconcerned to drag the Zionist entity into a new Israeli aggression on Gaza, as it moved from the phase of just reacting into the phase of taking actions in its relation with the Israeli occupation. Also, it completely realizes that accumulating power is more important than draining it in successive battles that do not achieve any strategic results as well as does not want to provide a lifeline to the government of Netanyahu. 

Situation Report:
It seems that the potential for launching a new Zionist offensive on Gaza next Spring are almost poor in light of the current political and security briefings supported by different discouraging factors. Yet, the equation would be different in case a big accident affected one of the confrontation's parties like the assassination of one of Hamas' prominent leaders in Gaza, the abduction of Zionist soldiers by the resistance, the explosion of a regional conflict between Iran and Hezbollah with the Israeli occupation. Otherwise, any kind of escalation would be limited temporally, spatially and operationally.