Amid Israel’s wavering stance on Gaza in recent weeks and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s efforts to preserve the stability of his ruling coalition, he has made new promises to Bezalel Smotrich. These promises involve annexing parts of the Gaza Strip under what is referred to as “Israeli sovereignty” in exchange for Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir remaining in the coalition government.

Meanwhile, the Israeli military leadership has presented Netanyahu with three proposals that blend military and political dimensions. The preferred option among them is a comprehensive deal, considered the least costly and most realistic:
    1.    First Option: Full military control over the remaining populated areas in Gaza—including Gaza City, the central refugee camps, and the Mawasi area of Khan Younis—through a broad offensive that could last over six months. However, the military does not favor this path, as it would involve abandoning efforts to retrieve Israeli captives held in Gaza, result in significant army casualties, and lead to long-term military entanglement in governing the Strip.
    2.    Second Option: Regain full control over the Netzarim Corridor, effectively cutting off Al-Rashid Coastal Road. This would isolate Gaza City from the central camps and separate Mawasi Khan Younis from central Gaza south of Deir al-Balah. This option would be paired with continued “military pressure”—a euphemism for the killing of civilians, starvation, and systematic destruction.
    3.    Third Option: Move toward a comprehensive agreement involving the release of both Israeli and Palestinian prisoners, a withdrawal from most of Gaza, and the establishment of a new, internationally recognized governing authority in the Strip.

However, Netanyahu may have a different agenda. His core political principle appears to be maintaining coalition unity and remaining in office until the next scheduled elections in October 2026. This helps explain his repeated hesitation and backtracking from any moves toward a deal or ending the war.

As a result, a recent agreement was reached between Netanyahu, Smotrich, and Ben-Gvir, setting out a new plan as a condition for their continued participation in the coalition. This plan includes:
    •    Annexing parts of the Gaza Strip in two or more stages. The first stage would involve annexing the border buffer zone, which stretches 800 to 1,200 meters deep, amounting to approximately 40 to 45 square kilometers. The second stage would include the annexation of an area in northern Gaza approximately 5 kilometers deep, covering 25 to 30 square kilometers.
    •    Initiating partial displacement by implementing practical mechanisms to facilitate the exit of specific categories of Palestinians—such as the wounded, students, and those seeking long-term stays abroad for personal reasons—through the Kerem Shalom commercial crossing or the Allenby Bridge crossing with Jordan.

In conclusion, while Netanyahu’s contradictory actions make future steps difficult to predict, the two most plausible paths appear to be either moving toward a comprehensive agreement, or pivoting toward an annexation and partial displacement project—a route that would offer Netanyahu an acceptable way to end the war, allowing him to claim what he calls a “total victory.”